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The Continuity of Statutory and 
Constitutional Interpretation: An Essay 
for Phil Frickey 
Ernest A. Young† 
This conference on the work of Philip Frickey as scholar, teacher, and 
institutional citizen has been an education—a somewhat daunting one—in how 
to achieve greatness as an academic. As a relatively junior person in this 
company, I have little to contribute to that discussion. But what I can perhaps 
document is Phil‘s intellectual influence on a rising generation of scholars in 
American public law. Like the monks who preserved the classical heritage of 
Greece and Rome, Phil and his coauthors, particularly Bill Eskridge, have 
preserved the ―Legal Process‖ jurisprudence of 1950s giants like Henry Hart, 
Albert Sacks, Herbert Wechsler, and Lon Fuller and transmitted it to 
contemporary legal scholars. More than this, Phil‘s brilliant elaboration of that 
jurisprudence in his own work has made the Legal Process approach 
respectable in a more divided and critical age. As someone who values the 
wisdom of tradition and believes the Legal Process thinkers still have much to 
teach us,
1
 I consider these to be laudable contributions indeed. 
This Essay seeks to honor Phil by exploring the contributions of his Legal 
Process approach to a problem near and dear to his heart: the uses and 
legitimacy of canons of statutory construction. I focus, as Phil did in his most 
 
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
† Alston & Bird Professor, Duke Law School. This Essay is part of a festschrift in honor 
of Philip Frickey, and as such I intend it to express my profound gratitude for his scholarly 
contributions and manifold personal kindnesses over the years. I will miss him, on both counts. I 
am grateful to Dan Farber and the California Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this 
conference, to Erin Blondel for comments on the manuscript, and to Greg Coleman, Guy Charles, 
and Heather Gerken for helpful conversations on the Northwest Austin case. 
1. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 
1143 (2005) (arguing for a Legal Process approach to conflicts between domestic and 
supranational courts) [hereinafter Young, Institutional Settlement]; Ernest A. Young, 
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory & Constitutional Interpretation, 72 
 619 (1994) (emphasizing the importance of tradition in constitutional theory). 
Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2010 5:47 PM 
1372 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1371 
recent work, on the canon of constitutional avoidance
2
—that is, the rule that 
courts should construe statutes to avoid significant ―doubt‖ as to their 
constitutionality.
3
 That canon figured prominently in one of the most 
anticipated cases of the 2008 Supreme Court Term, in which the Justices turned 
aside a major challenge to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by construing the 
Act to avoid a potential constitutional problem.
4
 This sort of avoidance boasts a 
pedigree dating at least as far back as Justice Brandeis‘s famous concurrence in 
the Ashwander case.
5
 Although the avoidance canon has come under attack in 
recent years, Phil‘s work has defended it on Legal Process grounds.
6
 
This Essay largely supports Phil‘s defense of the avoidance canon, but 
links that defense to another set of canons that Phil has criticized: the various 
clear statement rules of statutory construction that Phil and Bill Eskridge 
memorably labeled ―quasi-constitutional law.‖
7
 These rules require that 
Congress make its intent especially clear when it legislates in areas of particular 
constitutional sensitivity—for example, by intruding on the prerogatives of the 
states.
8
 Although Professors Frickey and Eskridge were concerned that clear 
statement rules represented an illegitimate form of ―stealth‖ constitutionalism,
9
 
I suggest here that they in fact reflect a continuity of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation that the Legal Process thinkers noted long ago. 
That continuity, in turn, arises from a basic but underappreciated fact about our 
Constitution: the canonical document leaves much of the critical ―constitutive‖ 
work in our polity—that is, the function of setting up our governmental 
institutions, defining their composition and procedures, and bestowing (and 
limiting) their powers—to be accomplished by statutes, regulations, and other 
 
2. See generally Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance 
Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 
93  397 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (―[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.‖); see also Nat‘l Labor Relations 
Bd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979). 
4. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
5. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
6. Frickey, supra note 2, at 399–400 (―Brandeis‘s rules of avoidance may not have worn 
well over the years . . . . [A] plethora of commentators and judges of different ideological 
perspectives have in various ways criticized the canon or related techniques.‖). 
7. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45  593 (1992). 
8. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (interpreting an ambiguous federal 
statute not to regulate the internal operations of a state government absent a clear statement of 
Congress‘s intent to do so). 
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term, Foreword: 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 26, 85 (1994) (―Insistence upon a super-clear statement 
from Congress when its statutes venture close to—but not beyond—a constitutional periphery is a 
way for the Court to enforce its favored constitutional values, but without risking an open 
confrontation with Congress.‖). 
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subconstitutional materials.
10
 Because important structural statutes, like the 
Voting Rights Act, perform significant constitutive functions, it makes sense 
that they should be interpreted in light of constitutional purposes, including 
federalism and other structural values. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I develops two problems in 
statutory construction—the canon of constitutional avoidance and judge-made 
clear statement rules—by reference to some major cases decided in the 
Supreme Court‘s 2008 Term. Part II elaborates the Legal Process School‘s 
approach to these sorts of problems of canonical construction, with particular 
emphasis on Professor Frickey‘s work in this vein. Part III then develops the 
central Legal Process insight that rules of construction are part of constitutional 
interpretation as a means of interpreting and protecting the broader structural 
aspects of the Constitution, namely, federalism and separation of powers.  
I 
TWO PROBLEMS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The 2008 Supreme Court Term was notable largely for its statutory 
decisions, which addressed basic matters of election law,
11
 equal rights,
12
 and 
the preemptive effect of federal law.
13
 These cases illustrate two issues that 
have loomed large in Professor Frickey‘s work: the canon of constitutional 
avoidance and the clear statement rules of statutory construction. The 
avoidance canon is ―a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise 
of this Court‘s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a 
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of 
the case.‖
14
 In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. 
Holder, the Court adopted a vigorously contested reading of the Voting Rights 
Act to avoid serious questions about the Act‘s constitutionality. In three 
preemption cases, Good, Wyeth, and Clearing House, the Court rejected 
challenges to a prominent clear statement rule requiring that Congress clearly 
articulate any intent to displace state law. Each of these decisions thus 
implicated the legitimacy of canons of construction designed to enforce 
constitutional values. 
 
10. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 
408 (2007) (developing the point that statutes, regulations, and other forms of ―ordinary‖ law 
perform constitutional functions in our legal system). 
11. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); see also 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1243 (2009) (holding that section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act did not allow plaintiffs to raise ―crossover district‖ claims). 
12. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
13. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009); Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009). 
14. Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam). 
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A. Constitutional Avoidance and the Northwest Austin Case 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires state and local governments in 
certain parts of the United States to ―preclear‖ all changes in state election 
procedure with federal authorities in Washington, D.C.
15
 Those authorities may 
preclear a new procedure only after concluding that the proposed change 
neither ―has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.‖
16
 The Northwest Austin case involved 
a local public utility district that wished to allow district residents to elect its 
board members while voting in general county elections rather than at special 
polling places. The public utility district, which had never been accused of 
racial bias in the conduct of its elections,
17
 argued that it was entitled under the 
terms of the statute to ―bail out‖ of section 5‘s preclearance requirement.
18
 If 
the Act were interpreted to foreclose an entity like the utility district from 
bailing out, the district insisted, then section 5 would exceed Congress‘s 
authority to enforce the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment.
19
 
The district‘s statutory argument rested on section 4(b) of the Act, which 
provides that a ―State or political subdivision‖ may bring suit to bail out of its 
obligations under the Act by demonstrating that it has not been guilty of any 
unlawful discriminatory practices.
20
 A three-judge district court rejected this 
argument, concluding that section 14(c)(2) of the Act confined the ―political 
subdivisions‖ that may seek bailout to a ―county or parish . . . [or] any other 
subdivision of a State which conducts registration for voting.‖
21
 Because the 
utility district did not register voters, the district court concluded that it was 
ineligible for bailout.
22
 
In the Supreme Court, the utility district argued that section 14(c)(2)‘s 
restrictive definition of ―political subdivision‖ applied only to certain portions 
of the Act, and that the bailout provisions should be interpreted to embrace a 
broader, ordinary meaning of ―political subdivision‖ congruent with the ambit 
of the preclearance obligation itself.
23
 The Court had previously interpreted that 
 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
16. Id. 
17. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 (2009). 
18. Id. at 2510. 
19. Id. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits each government in the United States from 
denying any citizen the right to vote based on that citizen‘s ―race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.‖  amend. XV, § 1. Section 2 states that ―Congress shall have the power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.‖ Id. § 2.  
20. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 279 (D.D.C. 
2008), rev’d sub nom Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); see 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a)(1), 1973c(a). 
21. 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231; see 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2). 
22. 573 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
23. Brief for Appellant at 17–22, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. 
Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322). 
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obligation, after all, to cover entities such as cities that did not register voters.
24
 
However, election law experts initially gave this argument relatively little 
chance of success; as Heather Gerken wrote, ―the statutory argument is one that 
almost no one . . . thought was particularly tenable because of prior Court 
opinions.‖
25
 Nor was it clear that, if interpreted to preclude bailout for entities 
like the district, the Act would actually be unconstitutional.
26
 After all, the 
three-judge district court had not only rejected the district‘s bailout argument 
but also upheld the Act‘s constitutionality as interpreted.
27
 Finally, as Justice 
Thomas‘s concurrence pointed out, there was some doubt whether the district‘s 
statutory argument could—even if successful—support all the relief that the 
district had requested.
28
 Nonetheless, the Court brushed these objections aside, 
interpreting the Act to permit ―bailout‖ under the circumstances and resting that 
interpretation squarely on the need to avoid any doubt as to the Act‘s 
constitutionality.
29
 
Chief Justice Roberts grounded the avoidance doctrine in a restrained 
view of the Court‘s role vis-à-vis Congress: 
In assessing [serious constitutional] questions, we are keenly mindful 
of our institutional role. We fully appreciate that judging the 
constitutionality of an Act of Congress is ―the gravest and most 
delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform.‖ ―The Congress is 
a coequal branch of government whose Members take the same oath 
we do to uphold the Constitution of the United States.‖ The Fifteenth 
Amendment empowers ―Congress,‖ not the Court, to determine in the 
first instance what legislation is needed to enforce it.
30
 
 
24. United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm‘rs, 435 U.S. 110, 121–22 (1978). 
25. Posting of Heather K. Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/06/ 
supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (June 22, 2009, 10:42 AM). Likewise, Richard Hasen 
opined shortly after oral argument that ―[s]ince there‘s no good statutory loophole, the larger 
constitutional question seems unavoidable.‖ Richard L. Hasen, Sordid Business: Will the Supreme 
Court Kill the Voting Rights Act?, , Apr. 27, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2216888/. 
26. The avoidance at issue in Northwest Austin was thus ―modern,‖ as opposed to 
―classical‖ avoidance. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 1945 
(1997) (developing this distinction). Under the classical version of the doctrine, a court interprets 
the statute using traditional methods of statutory construction and then actually decides whether 
that construction would be constitutional. If this best interpretation would require invalidating the 
statute, the court then adopts another acceptable construction that avoids that necessity. See id. at 
1949. Under the modern version of the doctrine, however, a court displaces the ―best‖ 
interpretation as long as that interpretation raises serious constitutional ―doubts‖; the court does 
not actually resolve those doubts by deciding the constitutional question. See id. In Northwest 
Austin, the Court did not actually decide whether section 5 of the Voting Rights Act would be 
unconstitutional if construed to foreclose bailout to an entity like the district. 
27. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 224. 
28. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517–19 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
29. Id. at 2513 (majority opinion). 
30. Id. (citations omitted); see Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005) (asserting that 
―[t]he [avoidance] canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting 
it‖). 
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As several commentators have noted, however, the avoidance canon is 
restrained in the sense that it avoids actually striking down the law in question, 
yet it is quite activist in other important senses.
31
 Frederick Schauer has pointed 
out, for example, that a court that bypasses the most plausible interpretation of 
a statute to avoid constitutional doubt effectively denies force to the disfavored 
interpretation, just as if the court had struck that interpretation down.
32
 
Similarly, Judge Richard Posner has observed that the avoidance canon creates 
a ―judge-made constitutional ‗penumbra‘ that has much the same prohibitory 
effect as the . . . Constitution itself.‖
33
 The upshot, as Professor Frickey has 
stated, is that ―the avoidance canon, purportedly designed to avoid the fraught 
business of judicial review and potential confrontations with a coordinate 
branch, actually amounts to a robust version of judicial review without the 
safeguards of reasoned elaboration of constitutional law.‖
34
 
As I have discussed at greater length elsewhere, it seems clear that the 
avoidance canon must be defended as a normative canon of statutory 
construction—that is, as a means of enforcing particular constitutional values, 
not as a ―best guess‖ at what Congress would have wanted under the 
circumstances.
35
 When a court avoids a constitutional doubt, it is protecting 
constitutional values by resisting statutory interpretations that would put 
pressure on those values. As Professor Frickey has pointed out, ―[t]he canon 
provides a means to mediate the borderline between statutory interpretation and 
constitutional law, and between the judicial and legislative roles, where judicial 
line-drawing is especially difficult and where underenforced constitutional 
values are at stake.‖
36
 The Northwest Austin case highlights this function. If 
voting experts are right that ―the Court applied the canon to adopt an 
implausible reading of a statute that appeared contrary to textual analysis, 
congressional intent, and administrative interpretation,‖
37
 then the avoidance 
 
31. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995  71, 73–74; 
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
 800, 816 (1983). I use ―activist‖ here to signify simply an assertion of judicial power vis-
à-vis the political branches. See generally Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative 
Politics, 73  1139 (2002) (exploring the meaning of judicial ―activism‖). 
32. Schauer, supra note 31, at 87. 
33. Posner, supra note 31, at 816. 
34. Frickey, supra note 2, at 400; see also Schauer, supra note 31, at 90 (making the same 
point). 
35. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78  1549 (2000). On the distinction between 
―normative‖ and ―descriptive‖ canons, see Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl 
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45  561, 563 (1992); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and 
Its Consequences, 45  743, 749 (1992); see also Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional 
Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009  181, 185 (making a 
similar distinction between ―substantive‖ and ―language‖ canons). 
36. Frickey, supra note 2, at 402. 
37. Hasen, supra note 35, at 3 (emphasis added). 
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canon plainly played a strong normative role in driving the Court‘s construction 
of the Act. 
B. “Quasi-Constitutional” Clear Statement Rules and the Preemption Cases 
In its 2008 Term, the Supreme Court decided three major cases 
concerning the preemptive effect of federal regulatory regimes on state law. 
Historically, the centerpiece of the Court‘s preemption jurisprudence has been a 
―presumption against preemption‖ in construing federal statutes. In Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
38
 the Court stated that, generally speaking, ―the 
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal 
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖
39
 This 
presumption is the most important, and most frequently invoked, of the pro-
federalism clear statement rules that Professors Frickey and Eskridge examine 
in their seminal article on Quasi-Constitutional Law.
40
 In that article, Frickey 
and Eskridge recognize the virtues of clear statement rules as a means of 
protecting constitutional values without going so far as to invalidate 
legislation.
41
 Nonetheless, they criticize such rules as undermining judicial 
candor by encouraging judges to mask substantive value choices in the rhetoric 
of statutory construction, and as reflecting—in particular contexts—particular 
value choices that they find normatively suspect.
42
 
Two of the 2008 Term preemption decisions, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good 
and Wyeth v. Levine, explicitly rested on the presumption against preemption.
43
 
In Altria, smokers of so-called light cigarettes sued cigarette manufacturers 
under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, claiming that the manufacturers 
had fraudulently advertised that their cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine 
 
38. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
39. Id. at 230. For a historical account of the development of the Court‘s preemption 
jurisprudence, and the Rice presumption‘s place within that development, see Stephen A. 
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79  767 (1994); see also Ernest A. 
Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in ,
 249, 250–54 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (stressing 
the functional importance of the Rice presumption). 
40. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7. Oddly, Professors Frickey and Eskridge did not 
include Rice‘s presumption against preemption of state law among the five pro-federalism clear 
statement rules discussed in the Vanderbilt article. This may be because that article focused on the 
Court‘s ―super-strong clear statement rules‖ in the federalism area, see id. at 619, and the Rice 
presumption—despite its structural importance—has never been ―super-strong‖; indeed, it is often 
ignored or overcome by relatively weak evidence of Congress‘s intent. Moreover, Frickey and 
Eskridge focused on the new federalism rules developed by the late Burger and Rehnquist Courts, 
whereas the Rice rule predates those courts by nearly half a century. In any event, Rice operates in 
much the same way as the other clear statement rules that Frickey and Eskridge discussed, and it 
raises many of the same potential problems. 
41. See id. at 630–32. 
42. See id. at 632–45. 
43. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2009); Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009). 
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than regular brands.
44
 The manufacturers argued that both the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act and the Federal Trade Commission‘s 
enforcement efforts under the Act preempted these state law claims.
45
 The 
Supreme Court, however, rejected both these preemption arguments.
46
 The Rice 
presumption against preemption figured importantly in the Court‘s analysis of 
the federal statute‘s express preemption clause. As Justice Stevens wrote for the 
majority, ―when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than 
one plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‗accept the reading that disfavors pre-
emption.‘‖
47
 
Wyeth involved a state common law tort suit against a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer alleging failure adequately to warn that the administration of an 
antinausea drug in a certain fashion could cause gangrene.
48 
The manufacturer 
argued that the Food and Drug Administration‘s approval of the drug and its 
warning label preempted the plaintiff‘s state law claim. In rejecting the 
manufacturer‘s argument, the Court embraced the Rice presumption against 
preemption even more firmly than it had in Altria, calling that presumption a 
―cornerstone[] of our pre-emption jurisprudence.‖
49
 Moreover, the Court 
explicitly rejected two attempts by the defendants to undermine that 
presumption, holding that the presumption applied notwithstanding 
longstanding federal regulatory activity in the relevant field, and that it applied 
to ―implied conflict pre-emption‖ claims as well as to express preemption 
claims.
50
 The Court likewise turned aside a frontal assault on Rice by the 
manufacturer and its amici arguing that the presumption was inconsistent with 
the original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.
51
 
The third case, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, found the plain meaning 
of the statute in question sufficient to reject the preemption argument, but 
nonetheless stressed the magnitude of the intrusion on state law that would 
result from a preemption finding.
52
 Clearing House was a suit by the federal 
 
44. Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 541. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 549, 551. 
47. Id. at 543 (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). 
48. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1191–92. 
49. Id. at 1194. 
50. Id. at 1195 n.3. 
51. See Brief for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 2, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) (―The time has come for 
this Court to clarify once and for all that . . . the presumption against preemption simply does not 
apply to the analysis of whether state law conflicts with federal law.‖). For an effort to refute that 
argument, see Brief for Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 4–18, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). I was 
the primary author of the latter brief, along with Erin Glenn Busby and Melissa Davis, and we 
were honored that Phil Frickey was a signatory. 
52. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass‘n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720–22 (2009). For an extended 
discussion of the banking law issues in Clearing House and the case‘s place in the Roberts Court‘s 
evolving preemption jurisprudence, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The 
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and a banking trade group to 
enjoin New York‘s Attorney General from requesting certain nonpublic 
information from national banks doing business in the state. Rejecting the claim 
that the state‘s action was preempted, Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion brushed 
aside the federal agency‘s claim for Chevron deference
53
 and construed the 
National Bank Act‘s grant of exclusive ―visitorial powers‖ to the OCC as 
coexisting with the state‘s power to enforce its fair lending laws.
54
 The Court 
emphasized that ―[t]he consequences of the [OCC‘s] regulation‖—its effort to 
foreclose state officials from enforcing their own valid banking laws—―cast 
doubt upon its validity.‖
55
 Although the Court disclaimed the need to rely on 
Rice, its analysis came close to recognizing that such an intrusion on state 
regulatory authority is presumptively not Congress‘s intent. In all three of the 
2008 Term preemption cases, then, the Court sought some heightened showing 
of congressional intent before interpreting federal statutes to intrude on state 
prerogatives. 
As I have already noted, Professors Frickey and Eskridge have been 
skeptical of clear statement rules like the presumption against preemption. 
They summarized their argument: 
[I]n the abstract there are powerful arguments for quasi-constitutional 
law rooted in a vision of our public lawmaking processes as a 
partnership in which the judiciary plays an active role, but eventually 
defers to the democratically accountable branches. In some contexts, 
these arguments may have substantial persuasive power. We fear, 
however, that they have had little contextual bite in many of the recent 
cases . . . . We also fear that a lack of recognition and candor about 
what the Court has done recently with quasi-constitutional law has 
submerged a variety of hotly contestable normative and empirical 
issues.
56
 
At least as traditionally formulated, the Rice presumption seems vulnerable to 
some of these criticisms. Just as the Northwest Austin Court justified the 
avoidance canon in terms of deference to Congress,
57
 the Court has always 
 
Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, in 
 (Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 
forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216.  
53. Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), 
the courts defer to a federal administrative agency‘s interpretation of a statute that it administers if 
the statute is ambiguous and the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable. On the complicated 
interaction of Chevron with the Rice presumption in preemption cases, see Ernest A. Young, 
Executive Preemption, 102  869 (2008). 
54. Clearing House, 129 S. Ct. at 2715; see Wilmarth, supra note 52 (manuscript at 44–48) 
(suggesting structural similarities between Justice Scalia‘s refusal to defer to the OCC under 
Chevron in Cuomo and analysis under a presumption against preemption). 
55. Clearing House, 129 S. Ct. at 2717. 
56. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 646. 
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2010 5:47 PM 
1380 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1371 
phrased the presumption against preemption in terms of what Congress most 
likely wanted.
58
 Yet it is far from clear that Congress in fact harbors any 
general solicitude for state regulatory authority that would justify the Rice 
presumption as a descriptive canon of statutory construction. The presumption 
is better justified as a normative canon designed to protect state autonomy in 
our federal system. 
If Rice cannot be justified as a best guess at Congress‘s likely intent, then 
the criticism advanced by Professors Frickey and Eskridge—that clear 
statement issues undermine candor and submerge contestable normative 
issues—have some force. I believe that criticism can be met, however, and that 
it is best met from within the Legal Process paradigm that Frickey and Eskridge 
have done so much to advance. That paradigm, I argue, offers a persuasive 
justification for both clear statement rules like the Rice presumption and the 
canon of constitutional avoidance. I develop this argument in the next Part. 
II 
LEGAL PROCESS THEORY AND THE CONSTITUTION OUTSIDE THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Recasting the avoidance canon and the Rice presumption against 
preemption as normative canons of statutory construction hardly ends the 
debate over their legitimacy. Normative canons are, after all, highly 
controversial.
59
 Justice Scalia, for example, has questioned ―where the courts 
get the authority to impose‖ such rules.
60
 Judges employing such canons cannot 
cast themselves as ―faithful agents‖ of Congress; rather, they must find some 
other source of legal justification for the normative values that the canons 
protect. I suggest that that source is the Constitution itself—the constitutional 
values implicated by the underlying ―doubt‖ in the case of the avoidance canon, 
and the particular value of federalism in the case of the presumption against 
preemption.
61
 Further, I claim that this argument is best defended in terms of 
 
58. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (describing the 
presumption as an ―assumption‖ about when Congress means to supersede state police powers). 
After all, the Court generally invokes the Rice presumption in tandem with a statement that ―‗[t]he 
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone‘ in every pre-emption case.‖ Altria Group, Inc. v. 
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) (also quoting 
Medtronic). 
59. See ,
 945 (4th ed. 
2007). 
60 ,
29 (1997); see also Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 744 (observing that the ―substantive form of 
canonical construction raises a . . . central concern . . . that judicial policymaking through the 
guise of statutory interpretation is illegitimate.‖). 
61. I have elaborated these views at greater length elsewhere. On the avoidance canon, see 
Young, supra note 35, at 1585–99. On the presumption against preemption, see Ernest A. Young, 
Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 
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Legal Process ideas concerning the continuity of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation. 
A. The Legal Process School 
Neil Duxbury has characterized the Legal Process jurisprudence as 
―premissed [sic] on nothing more specific or substantial than an attitude‖ rather 
than a coherent theory; this, he suggests, makes the precise nature of process 
jurisprudence ―remarkably difficult to pin down.‖
62
 He notes, moreover, that 
―[t]hose who adopted the process attitude were concerned not so much with 
developing a distinct theory as with cultivating their attitude in order to cast 
light on what they considered to be the principal problems in the creation and 
application of law.‖
63
 This is, to some extent at least, a fair description not only 
of Henry Hart and Al Sacks‘s project in The Legal Process itself but also of the 
work of Phil Frickey, Bill Eskridge, and others reviving and developing Legal 
Process principles in the specific context of statutory construction. In each 
instance, any effort to crystallize the content of Legal Process jurisprudence 
takes a backseat to handling particular doctrinal problems. 
Certain key principles do emerge, nonetheless.
64
 One is the principle of 
―institutional settlement,‖ which holds that law should allocate decision making 
to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions, and that the 
decisions reached by those institutions must then be respected by other actors in 
the system, even if those actors might have reached a different conclusion had 
they decided the matter in the first instance.
65
 Richard Fallon identifies a 
second and related ―anti-positivist principle,‖ which sees the law allocating 
responsibility among institutions ―as a rich, fluid, and evolving set of norms for 
effective governance and dispute resolution, not as a positivist system of fixed 
and determinate rules.‖
66
 This view implies that ―[a]ny particular legal directive 
must be seen and interpreted in light of the whole body of law‖ and that ―legal 
 
46  1733, 1848–50 (2005) [hereinafter Young, Making Federalism 
Doctrine]; Young, supra note 39, at 250–54. 
62. , 207 (1995). 
63. Id. 
64. I am indebted here to Richard Fallon‘s helpful summary of six characteristic Legal 
Process assumptions, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 
47  953, 963–66 (1994), as well as to Professors Eskridge and Frickey‘s extended 
introduction to the Legal Process materials themselves, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to ,
 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
65. See , supra note 64, at 4 (―[D]ecisions which are the duly arrived at 
result of duly established procedures . . . ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society 
unless and until they are duly changed.‖); id. at 158 (stressing the importance of comparative 
institutional competence in allocating authority to decide); see also Fallon, supra note 64, at 964; 
Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at 1158–63 (discussing this principle in the context 
of foreign affairs law). 
66. Fallon, supra note 64, at 965. 
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interpretation should be purposive, not rigid or mechanical.‖
67
 Relatedly, in 
construing the allocation of decision-making authority, ―the principles and 
policies underlying federalism and the separation of powers deserve special 
weight.‖
68
 More generally, institutional settlement puts process firmly at the 
center of legal thinking.
69
 
Although Legal Process thinkers emphasized the importance of 
nonjudicial actors such as administrative agencies, they envisioned a special 
role for courts. They believed, for example, that ―[t]he rule of law . . . requires 
the availability of judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamental legal 
principles.‖
70
 The fundamental constraint is that ―courts must be principled in 
their reasoning.‖
71
 That is, courts must decide cases based on general, neutral 
reasons that transcend the immediate controversy before them.
72
  
But subject to that constraint, process jurisprudence embraced a principle 
of ―reasoned elaboration‖ according broad creative powers to courts.
73
 For Hart 
and Sacks, for example, ―[l]aw is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a 
continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social living.‖
74
 Hence, 
judges should apply statutes and common law doctrines ―in ways that subserve 
their purposes, as well as the general purposes of the law.‖
75
 
Although this Legal Process worldview is often portrayed as a response to 
the Legal Realists,
76
 it may be more accurate to say that process jurisprudence 
emerged as a parallel critique of Formalism that differed from Realism by 
insisting on the continuing value of rationalism in law.
77
 Critically, Legal 
 
67. Id. (footnote omitted). 
68. Id. (identifying a ―principle of structural interpretation‖). 
69. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xciv–xcv. 
70. Fallon, supra note 64, at 966. 
71. Id. 
72. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
 1, 15 (1959). 
73. Fallon, supra note 64, at 966 (noting that the judicial role ―is limited to the reasoned 
elaboration of principles and policies that are ultimately traceable to more democratically 
legitimate decisionmakers‖); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: 
Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, reprinted in ,
 136 (1978). 
74 , supra note 64, at 148. 
75. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xcii. 
76. G. Edward White has argued, for example, that ―Reasoned Elaboration emerged in the 
late 1930‘s and the early 1940‘s when certain social experiences . . . generated overwhelming 
academic hostility to jurisprudential Realism.‖ White, supra note 73, at 136–37. Neil Duxbury 
brands this account ―another common misconception about American jurisprudence.‖ , 
supra note 62, at 205. This is because ―[h]istorically, the process-oriented approach to the study of 
law parallels if not precedes legal realism itself.‖ Id. But if we put historical chronology to one 
side, it may nonetheless be helpful to say that process jurisprudence offers a conceptual response 
to realist skepticism about the determinacy of law that does not require a retreat to formalism. As 
Professor Duxbury acknowledges, this response gained widespread currency ―once the mood of 
realism began to wane.‖ Id. 
77. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at lxii–lxiii: 
Although the legal realists generally did not, some of the centrist critics of formalism 
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Process thought insisted that law and the judicial function differ significantly 
from raw politics and policy.
78
 Thus, while acknowledging the Realist point 
that ―general directives often do not transparently tell officials and citizens 
what to do in specific situations,‖ Legal Process proponents of ―reasoned 
elaboration‖ rejected Realist claims that ―the official simply imposes a political 
interpretation on the general directive and that law is a prediction of how the 
official will exercise his discretion.‖
79
 Instead, the Legal Process School 
insisted that ―an official applying a ‗general directive arrangement‘ must 
‗elaborate the arrangement in a way which is consistent with the other 
established applications of it‘ and ‗must do so in a way which best serves the 
principles and policies it expresses.‘‖
80
 
In their Harvard Law Review Foreword, Professors Frickey and Eskridge 
echo this view of Legal Process jurisprudence as an intermediate position 
between the Legal Realist and formalist views: 
Courts are special because they are neutral bodies that adjudicate 
disputes. When the Court makes decisions about public law, it should 
be careful neither to sacrifice its adjudicative integrity, nor to 
undermine its legitimacy in American government. Within these 
confines, the Court should contribute to lawmaking by using its 
comparatively greater ability to engage in the reasoned elaboration of 
principle.
81
 
Courts, in other words, must maintain a distinction between law and politics, 
while recognizing that sensitivity to the underlying normative imperatives of 
American society remains part of their job description. They do this by 
elaborating legal texts and doctrines in light of the overall structure of 
American law and the broad general principles held by the American political 
community. As I hope to show in the next Section, this means—in part—
interpreting statutes in light of constitutional principles. 
 
valued rationality in law. But the centrists‘ version of rationalism was different from 
that of the formalists: the formalists believed in a static rationality . . . while the new 
rationalists believed that law‘s rationality is informed by an organic relationship among 
legal rules, social policies, and ethical principles. 
See also , supra note 62, at 205 (―[P]rocess jurisprudence exemplifies the emergence of 
reason as the dominant ideological and theoretical motif in American legal thought.‖). 
78. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59  376, 378 
(1946) (stating that a reasoned decision does not reflect the judge‘s ―personal predilections‖ but 
attempts ―to discover the natural principles underlying group life, so that [the judge‘s] decisions 
might conform to them‖). 
79. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 64, at xcii. 
80. Id. (quoting , supra note 64, at 147). 
81. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 34; see also , supra note 62, at 205 
(―Process jurisprudence . . . marks the beginning of American lawyers attempting to explain legal 
decision-making not in terms of deductive logic or the intuitions of officials, but in terms of 
reason which is embodied in the fabric of the law itself.‖). For a similar view, not explicitly 
framed in Legal Process terms, see Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 
 959 (2008). 
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B. Reasoned Elaboration and the Constitution Outside the Constitution 
Debates about canons of construction—including the avoidance canon 
and, more recently, clear statement rules—have long been a staple of the 
academic literature on legislation. In this Section, I argue that we can advance 
those debates by looking back to the Legal Process concept of ―reasoned 
elaboration.‖ Viewed from this perspective, statutory interpretation always 
takes place against a background of underlying purposes and values, including 
constitutional values. That basic continuity of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation, in turn, allows us to think of the avoidance canon and the clear 
statement rules not so much as substitutes for constitutional adjudication, but 
rather as a means by which constitutional principles are sometimes vindicated. 
Justice Frankfurter, a patron saint for Legal Process thinkers of the next 
generation, considered the avoidance canon to be a ―rule of constitutional 
adjudication‖ rather than a rule of statutory construction.
82
 Likewise, Henry 
Hart and Al Sacks considered ―policies of clear statement‖ to be 
―constitutionally imposed.‖
83
 This stance toward these two normative canons of 
interpretation flowed from the conception of reasoned elaboration and 
purposive interpretation at the heart of process jurisprudence: 
Not only does every particular legal arrangement have its own 
particular purpose but that purpose is always a subordinate one in aid 
of the more general and thus more nearly ultimate purposes of the law. 
Doubts about the purposes of particular statutes or decisional 
doctrines, it would seem to follow, must be resolved, if possible, so as 
to harmonize them with more general principles and policies. The 
organizing and rationalizing power of this idea is inestimable.
84
 
This conception of statutory purpose—that is, as not limited to the legislature‘s 
specific purposes, but also incorporating the more fundamental purposes of 
public law—effectively renders statutory and constitutional law continuous.
85
 
Courts (and possibly other interpreters) integrate statutes into the constitutional 
framework by interpreting statutes in line with constitutional principle. 
This same sense of continuity appears, although implicitly, in the structure 
of that other canonical Legal Process text, Henry Hart and Herbert Wechsler‘s 
monumental The Federal Courts and the Federal System.
86
 Hart and Wechsler 
 
82. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 477 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
83. , supra note 64, at 1376. 
84. Id. at 148. 
85. Cf. Frickey, supra note 2, at 407 (―Hart and Sacks saw their background assumptions 
concerning the purposivism of legislatures and legislation as constitutionally informed.‖). 
86. ,
 (1953). That text, unlike Hart and Sacks‘s Legal Process, was published early 
on and continues to be updated. The current version is 
,
 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter ]. 
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developed the structure of American federalism and separation of powers by 
placing constitutional features (e.g., Article III‘s provision for federal 
jurisdiction and limitation of judicial power to cases and controversies
87
) 
alongside statutory ones (e.g., the Supreme Court‘s jurisdictional statute or the 
Rules of Decision Act
88
) and judge-made doctrines (e.g., prudential standing 
rules or the abstention doctrines
89
). In other words, Hart and Wechsler 
emphasized the ―organic‖ interconnection of constitutionally entrenched and 
non-entrenched features in constituting our judicial system. Moreover, they 
offered an influential vision of federalism resting not on constitutional borders 
between enumerated federal functions and reserved state powers,
90
 but rather 
on Congress‘s activity in enacting federal law and the institutional impediments 
that hold that activity in check.
91
 
This Legal Process view of statutory and constitutional law as 
fundamentally integrated reflects a foundational reality of our constitutional 
system. If one considers the basic functions of a constitution—for example, 
constituting the government and conferring rights on individuals against 
government action
92
—one quickly recognizes that the Constitution itself is 
radically incomplete. For example, our canonical constitutional document says 
nothing about such basic governmental structures as political parties, the voting 
rules for ordinary legislation in Congress, or federal administrative agencies.
93
 
Likewise, the Constitution‘s rights provisions omit such basic and valued rights 
as protection from private discrimination, access to medical care and income 
security in old age, or preservation of a clean environment.
94
 These basic 
features of our legal system, all of which perform ―constitutional‖ functions, 
are codified in statutes or in even more ephemeral form, such as in the internal 
operating rules of the House and the Senate. 
 
87. art. III, § 2; see , supra note 86, at 113–27 (discussing 
standing as a constitutional doctrine rooted in Article III). 
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (prescribing the Supreme Court‘s jurisdiction over appeals 
from state courts); id. § 1652 (state laws as rules of decision); see , supra note 
86, at 448–58 (describing how statutory limits on Supreme Court review of state courts guarantee 
state courts‘ control over the content of state law); id. at 558–64 (describing the role of the Rules 
of Decision Act and the Erie doctrine in structuring American federalism). 
89. See , supra note 86, at 128 (discussing prudential standing rules); 
id. at 1049–1140 (discussing Pullman, Younger, Colorado River, and other judge-made abstention 
doctrines). 
90. See, e.g., amend. X; Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 
36  1 (1950). 
91. , supra note 86, at 459 (discussing ―the interstitial nature of federal 
law‖). For an important recent effort to flesh out this vision, see Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79  1321 (2001). 
92. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in 
 64, 65 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
93. See Young, supra note 10, at 415–22. 
94. See id. at 422–26. 
Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2010 5:47 PM 
1386 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1371 
Elsewhere, I have described these statutes, regulations, rules, and 
practices that perform constitutive functions as part of a ―constitution outside 
the Constitution.‖
95
 They differ from the canonical document, of course, in the 
sense that they are not entrenched against change by ordinary legislation. It is 
easy to overstate the importance of that distinction, however. The canonical 
Constitution frequently changes through interpretation without formal 
amendment,
96
 and many lesser enactments that create governmental structures 
or confer rights on individuals are, as a practical matter, quite difficult to 
overturn. Consider, for example, the Social Security Act, which is less likely to 
be repealed than many constitutional provisions. In any event, my point is not 
to suggest that statutes, regulations, and the like that perform constitutive 
functions should be accorded any special status in the law; rather, I mean 
simply to point out the undeniable reality that statutes and other forms of 
―ordinary‖ law frequently perform the same functions as constitutional law.
97
 
The role of this extra-canonical constitution is pervasive in our 
constitutional system. It accounts for the ability of our constitutional system to 
survive over two centuries of fairly radical political, social, and economic 
change even though formal amendment is nearly impossible. The Constitution 
adapts effectively because relatively little institutional detail is committed to 
entrenched provisions that cannot be readily changed.
98
 And although the Legal 
Process thinkers did not speak of a ―constitution outside the Constitution‖ in so 
many words, that notion meshes well with their view that ―the ‗law‘ bearing on 
allocations of institutional responsibility [is] a rich, fluid, and evolving set of 
norms for effective governance and dispute resolution.‖
99
 As I explain in the 
last Part, it also makes sense of their commitment to the avoidance doctrine and 
policies of clear statement as an integral part of constitutional interpretation. 
III 
THE CONTINUITY OF INTERPRETATION 
Professor Frickey has said that the canon of constitutional avoidance ―has 
the hybrid quality of quasi-constitutional law. It is a tool of public law on the 
borderline between constitutional law and subconstitutional law, and between 
judicial and legislative functions.‖
100
 Frickey approved of this hybrid quality of 
 
 95. See Young, supra note 10. For a similar argument, much earlier, see Karl N. 
Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34  1 (1934). 
 96. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (overruling recent precedent to hold 
that the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (adopting a considerably broader view of Congress‘s Commerce Power than that taken by 
prior courts). 
 97. See Young, supra note 10, at 448–61. On the constitutive role of statutes, see also 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 1215 (2001).  
 98. See Young, supra note 10, at 456–57. 
 99. Fallon, supra note 64, at 965. 
100. Frickey, supra note 2, at 461. 
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the avoidance canon, suggesting that it ―provides a means to mediate the 
borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional law . . . between 
the judicial and legislative roles . . . [and] between constitutional law and 
constitutional culture.‖
101
 Professors Frickey and Eskridge were more critical of 
―quasi-constitutional‖ clear statement rules, however. They insist in their 
Harvard Foreword that ―in statutory interpretation cases with constitutional 
issues in the background, the Court‘s capricious invention and invocation of 
super-strong clear statement rules avoids immediate constitutional conflict at 
the price of candid ventilation of constitutional concerns and sacrifices the 
reliability of the canonical interpretive regime constructed by the Court.‖
102
 
I argue that Professor Frickey was right about the avoidance canon but 
unduly sour on clear statement rules. Both principles reflect the Legal Process 
notion that statutory and constitutional interpretation are continuous, and they 
acknowledge the constitutive role that statutes and other extra-canonical legal 
materials play in forming our ―constitution outside the Constitution.‖ Both the 
avoidance canon and clear statement rules, like the presumption against 
preemption, counsel courts to interpret statutes in light of constitutional values. 
In so doing, they integrate statutes into the broader constitutional structure and 
vindicate broader public values immanent in constitutional law. Chief Justice 
Roberts‘s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act in Northwest Austin, for 
example, may not have represented the ―best‖ reading of the statutory text 
considered in isolation, but it did serve to integrate section 5‘s provisions into a 
broader federalist scheme designed to balance national power and state 
autonomy. 
The chief difference, of course, between the avoidance canon and clear 
statement rules is that the former comes into play where a legitimate doubt 
exists as to the constitutionality of a broad reading of the statute in question, 
whereas the latter tend to vindicate constitutional values even where no such 
doubt exists—that is, where there is no question that a broad reading of the 
relevant statute would be upheld against constitutional challenge. This 
difference accounts for Justice Thomas‘s dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon,
103
 
where the Court held that the Attorney General‘s regulation barring the use of 
lethal drugs for physician-assisted suicide, made legal under an Oregon state 
law, was inconsistent with the underlying federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA). The majority interpreted the federal statute narrowly in light of the 
traditional primacy of the states in regulating the medical profession. Justice 
Thomas, however, dissented: 
I agree with limiting the applications of the CSA in a manner 
consistent with the principles of federalism and our constitutional 
structure . . . . But that is now water over the dam. The relevance of 
 
101. Id. at 402. 
102. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 9, at 76. 
103. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
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such considerations was at its zenith in Raich, when we considered 
whether the CSA could be applied to the intrastate possession of a 
controlled substance [medical marijuana] consistent with the limited 
federal powers enumerated by the Constitution. Such considerations 
have little, if any, relevance where, as here, we are merely presented 
with a question of statutory interpretation, and not the extent of 
constitutionally permissible federal power.
104
 
Justice Thomas‘s view—at least in this opinion—seems to be that 
constitutional values belong only in constitutional cases; they have no role in 
shaping the interpretation of statutes when no doubt of the statutes‘ 
constitutionality exists. 
This view, it seems to me, misses an important, if underappreciated, 
aspect of the avoidance canon. As Professor Frickey noted, ―serious 
constitutional doubts sometimes extend to governmental actions that the courts 
are unlikely to invalidate as a matter of constitutional law, but that courts may 
nonetheless address by provisional institutional checking.‖
105
 Frickey argued 
that the avoidance canon is ―particularly appropriate‖ in two related contexts: 
first, ―cases, generally raising structural constitutional issues, in which line-
drawing by the Court is especially difficult,‖ and second, ―circumstances in 
which courts, facing institutional impediments to the exercise of traditional 
judicial review, use the canon to protect what amount to ‗underenforced‘ 
constitutional norms.‖
106
 These two contexts are connected, of course, in that 
underenforcement frequently stems from the problems that courts encounter 
drawing constitutional lines. 
Gonzales v. Oregon fits comfortably within both categories. The 
underlying constitutional concern involved the limits of the Commerce Power, 
an area of notorious line-drawing difficulty.
107
 And there is little doubt that—
owing to such difficulties—the constitutional principle of limited and 
enumerated powers is ―underenforced.‖
108
 Yet there was no constitutional 
―doubt‖ in the picture; if Congress had, in fact, authorized the Attorney General 
to make a rule barring the use of controlled drugs for physician-assisted 
suicide, the Court would surely have upheld that rule under Raich. Although 
the Oregon case involved no clear statement rules, the federalism concerns 
driving interpretation were more akin to such rules than to the avoidance canon. 
 
104. Id. at 301–02 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 74 
(2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
105. Frickey, supra note 2, at 459. 
106. Id. at 455; see also Young, supra note 35, at 1603–05 (making a similar argument). 
107. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 
125, 205 (discussing the Court‘s difficulties in drawing lines to limit Congress‘s 
powers over interstate commerce and the effect of those difficulties on the Court‘s legitimacy). 
108. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 
 1231, 1236–37 (1994). On underenforced constitutional norms generally, see Lawrence 
Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 
 1212 (1978). 
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The absence of a constitutional doubt declines in importance once we 
recognize that the statutes involved in cases like Gonzales v. Oregon also play 
constitutive roles in our federal system. In the absence of a Commerce Clause 
with bite—as it was interpreted, say, prior to 1937—the line between national 
and state authority will typically turn not on Article I of the Constitution but 
rather on the terms of the statutes that Congress enacts. A law like the 
Controlled Substances Act, for example, allocates some functions to national 
authorities while reserving others to the states.
109
 Once we understand that the 
texts of Article I and the Tenth Amendment do not exhaust the structural 
provisions of our federal constitution, it makes sense to say—contra Justice 
Thomas—that constitutional values are just as relevant when interpreting the 
CSA‘s constitutive scope as they are in interpreting the Commerce Clause 
itself.
110
 
The preemption cases in the Court‘s 2008 Term illustrate the same 
dynamic. These cases are particularly useful examples, precisely because there 
is no underlying constitutional ―problem‖ to be avoided by construing the 
federal statute narrowly. The Rice presumption is thus the only available means 
of giving independent or general weight to constitutional values of state 
autonomy, as its application serves to integrate federal statutes into a broader 
federalist structure that is respectful of those values. The substantive issues at 
stake in preemption cases, moreover, tend to be of broader importance than 
those at stake in constitutional litigation under the Commerce Clause itself.
111
 
Justice Stevens has thus consistently insisted that preemption cases are ―case[s] 
about federalism‖
112
—not simply exercises in statutory construction. 
The majority opinions in Altria Group, Wyeth, and Clearing House reflect 
this effort to integrate the statutory apparatus of the regulatory state into the 
more traditional federal structure reflected in the canonical Constitution. All 
three opinions grappled with the central puzzle of contemporary preemption 
doctrine—that is, how to assimilate potentially preemptive action by federal 
administrative agencies into a doctrinal structure that relies heavily on the built-
in political and institutional checks on Congress‘s action.
113
 In each case, the 
Court‘s insistence on evidence of Congress‘s intent to preempt state law—in 
the face of arguments that agency action preempted state regulation—preserved 
important values of state autonomy while reserving to Congress the option of 
 
109. See Young, supra note 10, at 429–33. 
110. Id. at 467–68. 
111. See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46  1349, 
1384–86 (2001). 
112. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 887 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991)). 
113. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: 
Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 2111 (2008); Young, supra note 39. 
On the importance of the political and inertial checks on Congress‘s action, see generally Clark, 
supra note 91, at 1339–42. 
Young.FINAL.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/30/2010 5:47 PM 
1390 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:1371 
expanding the scope of federal preemption should it feel the need to do so.
114
 
As in Gonzales v. Oregon, however, Justice Thomas‘s stance may be the 
most interesting. His position on the presumption against preemption, as 
reflected in recent cases, has been complex. On the one hand, Thomas has 
rejected the use of the Rice presumption in express preemption cases, where 
federal legislation explicitly preempts some state norms and the Court‘s task is 
to construe the extent of Congress‘s intent to displace state law. In his dissent in 
Good, for example, Thomas described the application of Rice in such cases as 
―nothing more than a ‗remnant of abandoned doctrine.‘‖
115
 Under his reading 
of the cases, ―the Court is no longer willing to unreasonably interpret expressly 
pre-emptive federal laws in the name of congressional purpose . . . or because 
Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States . . . . The 
text of the statute must control.‖
116
 And Thomas purported to reserve the 
question of Rice‘s application in Wyeth—an implied preemption case.
117
 
On the other hand, Justice Thomas‘s concurrence in Wyeth questioned the 
very notion of ―implied conflict preemption‖—an argument that has figured 
prominently in a number of important recent decisions.
118
 He wrote: 
I cannot join the majority‘s implicit endorsement of far-reaching 
implied pre-emption doctrines. In particular, I have become 
increasingly skeptical of this Court‘s ―purposes and objectives‖ pre-
emption jurisprudence. Under this approach, the Court routinely 
invalidates state laws based on perceived conflicts with broad federal 
policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of 
congressional purposes that are not embodied within the text of federal 
 
114. The possibility that Congress may revisit the issue and make clear its intent to preempt 
state law does not, of course, mean that such revision is easy. Legislative inertia is a powerful 
force, although such legislative overrides do occur. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 331 (1991). But to say that 
overriding a court‘s application of a clear statement rule may be difficult is simply to say that such 
rules may, in fact, function as meaningful constraints on legislative action. That, I have argued 
elsewhere, is a very good thing—especially given the weakness of traditional constitutional 
constraints in the federalism area. See Young, supra note 39, at 250–54. My central point here is 
that clear statement-type constraints derive their normative justification from the same 
constitutional principles that undergird more traditional doctrines of constitutional federalism. See 
also Young, Making Federalism Doctrine, supra note 61, at 1756 (offering a related defense of 
clear statement rules). 
115. 129 S. Ct. 538, 558 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992)). 
116. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
117. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1208 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(―Because it is evident from the text of the relevant federal statutes and regulations themselves 
that the state-law judgment below is not pre-empted, it is not necessary to decide whether, or to 
what extent, the presumption should apply in a case such as this one, where Congress has not 
enacted an express-pre-emption clause.‖). 
118. Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 
431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that he is 
―increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond their terms through doctrines of 
implied pre-emption‖). 
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law. Because implied pre-emption doctrines that wander far from the 
statutory text are inconsistent with the Constitution, I concur only in 
the judgment.
119
 
Three things are worth noting in Thomas‘s concurrence. First, a rollback of 
preemption doctrine to ―express preemption or nothing‖ would mark a 
significant gain for principles of state autonomy. Second, even though Thomas 
has questioned the Rice presumption against preemption, his insistence on 
express action by Congress before finding preemption is, effectively speaking, 
the same thing as a clear statement requirement. Finally, the Wyeth concurrence 
marks the most extended effort thus far to ground a view of preemption 
doctrine in explicitly constitutional principles of federalism, rather than in some 
imputed view of Congress‘s intent. 
Justice Thomas‘s stance in Wyeth thus reflects, at a profound level, the 
continuity of statutory and constitutional interpretation that informed the Legal 
Process School. Although one might quarrel with particular wrinkles of 
Thomas‘s approach to preemption, his suggestion that Congress must explicitly 
act to preempt state law unquestionably performs Professor Frickey‘s function 
of mediating the boundary between statutory and constitutional law. That same 
function is evident, although somewhat less explicit, in the majority opinions in 
both of the Court‘s 2008 Term preemption cases and the Northwest Austin 
decision. That fact suggests that, while the Legal Process School has been 
pronounced dead more than once, it remains alive and well in contemporary 
debates on the most important questions of statutory construction. We have Phil 
Frickey‘s work, in large part, to thank for that. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard history of American jurisprudence portrays various schools 
of thought coming and going in succession: the Legal Realists exploded the 
pretensions of mechanical jurisprudence; the Legal Process School responded 
to Legal Realism, and then gave way to Law and Economics, Critical Legal 
Studies, etc. The truth is, however, that each of these perspectives lingers long 
after other movements come on the scene. One need not deny the contributions 
of subsequent modes of legal thought to say that the Legal Process perspective 
remains viable and valuable today. From statutory construction
120
 to federal 
jurisdiction
121
 to international law,
122
 Legal Process thought enlightens and 
informs current debates. That this is so owes much to the work of Phil Frickey. 
 
119. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas‘s stance likely 
drew upon an important article by his former law clerk, Caleb Nelson, who likewise questioned 
broad notions of implied preemption while at the same time arguing that the Rice presumption is 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 
86  225 (2000). 
120. See , supra note 59, at 712–64. 
121. See , supra note 86, at 72–80. 
122. See Young, Institutional Settlement, supra note 1, at 1151–63. 
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I have focused in this Essay on Phil‘s work concerning the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and the various clear statement rules that protect 
constitutional values in statutory interpretation. Both principles, as Phil 
recognized, mediate the boundary between constitutional and statutory law. 
And I have suggested that this mediating function is particularly important in a 
constitutional system that leaves much of its institutional structure to be 
―constituted‖ by ordinary legislation. In such a system, it makes sense for 
constitutional and statutory interpretation to be continuous.  
The Legal Process School famously offered an idealized image of the 
legislature as composed of reasonable people pursuing reasonable ends in a 
reasonable manner.
123
 In closing this Essay, I want to suggest that whatever we 
actually think of legislators in this more skeptical time, that description 
amounts to a pretty good picture of our friend Phil Frickey. In a crowded 
intellectual field that puts a premium on novelty and counter-intuitiveness, 
Phil‘s career reminds us that reasonableness can be brilliantly and elegantly 
done.
124
 
 
123. See , supra note 64, at 1378 (suggesting that a court interpreting a 
statute ―should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the legislature was made up 
of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably‖). 
124. In this company, I use ―brilliantly‖ advisedly. See Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against 
Brilliance, 70  917 (1986). 
